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Introduction
The vitality which underpinned the revival in global eco-
nomic activity for two years rapidly faded during 2011, 
in a context of escalating uncertainty and worsening 
financial tensions. Up to the spring, it seemed that the 
consolidation of the recovery which had begun in mid-
2009 might continue, particularly given the impetus of 
accommodating fiscal policies in the advanced economies 
and the vigour of the emerging economies. However, this 
respite was apparently not enough to ensure sufficient 
progress in the thorough rectification of the imbalances 
revealed or caused by the first wave of the financial crisis 
and by the 2008-2009 economic recession.
This time, the financial tensions centred mainly on the 
government bond markets of certain euro area countries. 
Since the prospects for a reduction in the high level of 
public debt were not considered adequate to restore a 
sustainable long-term path – either because of deficien-
cies in the fiscal consolidation measures, or because of 
doubts about the economy’s growth potential – the yield 
differentials in relation to safe-haven assets increased 
dramatically. The obstacles hampering the implementa-
tion of the necessary structural measures in the various 
countries and, at European level, the debate over the 
economic safeguard mechanisms for economies encoun-
tering financing problems are greatly exacerbating the 
uncertainty for all economic agents. This environment is 
causing serious problems for financial institutions which 
hold large portfolios of government securities.
These difficulties are not confined to the euro area, 
since there is a similar debate on the fiscal policy to be 
conducted in the United States, and that is also foster-
ing the climate of uncertainty. Moreover, the euro area’s 
weakness could have an adverse effect on its trading 
partners.
Given this uncertainty and the weakening of external 
demand, the projections for the euro area produced as part 
of the twice-yearly exercise conducted by the Eurosystem 
– the results of which are published in the December 2011 
issue of the ECB Monthly Bulletin – show a sharp down-
grading of average GDP growth in 2012. In particular, a 
period of stagnating activity, or even a mild recession, is 
expected at the end of 2011 and in early 2012, while the 
subsequent recovery will be moderate. All the main catego-
ries of demand will contribute to the weakness of activity, 
including public expenditure on consumption and invest-
ment in the countries implementing fiscal consolidation.
In Belgium, activity and especially employment remained 
buoyant in early 2011. After that, however, the economy 
could not escape the adverse situation at European level 
and the weakening of domestic demand, Thus, according 
to the initial NAI estimate, GDP stagnated in the third 
quarter of 2011, and that sluggishness is likely to persist 
at the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012. In addition 
to the general uncertainty over the economic outlook in 
Europe, there is also the uncertainty caused in Belgium 
by the protracted absence, up to recently, of a plan for 
structural budget retrenchment and reforms aimed at 
consolidating the economy’s growth potential.
The economic projections discussed in this article were 
finalised as at 25 November 2011. They were drawn up 
on the basis of the Eurosystem’s technical assumptions 
decided on 17 November, the main ones being described 
in the box in section 1. As is usual in the case of these 
exercises, the projections for public finances presented 
in section 4 only take account of measures which have 8
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been formally approved by the authorities and specified 
in sufficient detail at the cut-off date for the exercise. It 
was therefore not possible to take account of the 2012 
budget measures announced after that date during the 
negotiations for the formation of the government. In 
order to avoid presenting outdated figures, the estimates 
for general government therefore do not go beyond 2011 
in this article. The last section describes the risk factors 
surrounding the economic outlook. They are particularly 
serious in the current context ; they concern, in particular, 
the definition and implementation of the essential meas-
ures to be taken in the euro area to contain and alleviate 
the sovereign debt crisis and the contagion affecting the 
financial institutions and, in Belgium’s case, the ability to 
restore the public debt to a path which is sustainable in 
the long term and to strengthen the growth potential and 
competitiveness of the economy. 
1.  International environment and 
assumptions
The global economy experienced a marked slowdown in 
activity and international trade during 2011. Although 
some deceleration was expected after two years of rela-
tively sustained recovery in most economies, the loss of 
momentum exceeded predictions, hitting the advanced 
economies particularly hard.
At the beginning of the year, the slowdown was due partly 
to temporary factors such as the disruption of output in 
the regions affected by the earthquake and the tsunami in 
Japan on 11 March. These disasters did not only have an 
impact on the country’s energy supply, they also disrupted 
certain motor vehicle or electronic equipment production 
chains worldwide. More fundamentally, the recovery in 
the United States was hampered by persistent problems 
on the property market and the labour market, in a con-
text in which the fiscal policy stimuli initially applied to 
support the recovery ceased to have any effect. On the 
contrary, as in other advanced economies, the effects of 
fiscal consolidation began to depress demand.
In contrast, despite the repercussions of weakening exter-
nal demand, the emerging economies maintained their 
dynamism, increasingly buttressed by the rising average 
incomes of their population and hence the strengthening 
domestic demand. This trend is expected to continue in 
2012, even though the rate of GDP growth may be slightly 
lower than in previous years, one factor being the contin-
ued efforts by the authorities to contain the risks of over-
heating which are becoming apparent in these economies.
The strength of demand from the emerging economies 
also explains why commodity prices on the international 
markets reverted to high levels at the beginning of 2011. 
In particular, while the price of a barrel of Brent was down 9
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to $ 79.6 on average in 2010, by April 2011 it was back 
up to $ 123, or close to the pre-recession peak recorded 
in 2008. Since then, oil prices have only eased slightly, 
remaining steady at around $  110 per barrel between 
August and October 2011, and – according to the for-
ward contracts – they will only drop slightly below that 
level in 2012.
During the summer the economic situation deteriorated 
sharply, as is evident from the slump in the industrial 
confidence indicators both in the United States and in 
the euro area and the other advanced economies. That 
deterioration was accompanied by a considerable height-
ening of tensions on the financial markets, in a context 
of increased risk aversion. This time, these tensions were 
centred mainly on the government bond markets of cer-
tain euro area countries, but their effects spread to the 
financial institutions. Owing to the uncertainty which they 
engender in the assessment of the outlook for income 
and demand among private players, these tensions 
ultimately have a negative impact on the activity of the 
countries concerned and that of their trading partners.
In fact, the start of the slowdown in activity revived 
investors’ fears about the ability of the States to repay 
their debts. In most of the advanced economies, not 
only the economic recession but also the measures 
aimed at strengthening the financial institutions during 
the first phase of the financial crisis led to a surge in the 
public debt and triggered dynamics which are considered 
unsustainable in the long term. The measures aimed 
at fiscal consolidation and structural reinforcement of 
growth are not deemed sufficient to remedy this situa-
tion. Moreover, the discussions on the establishment of 
safeguard mechanisms for countries in the euro area or 
the European Union facing serious financing problems 
greatly exacerbated the market uncertainty. The United 
States is also facing similar problems, as is evident from 
the debate on raising the limit on the public debt level in 
August, followed by the debate on the scale and nature 
of the consolidation measures.
On the government bond markets in the euro area, apart 
from the three countries – Greece, Ireland and Portugal – 
covered by the IMF and EU aid programme, a growing 
number of countries had to face a further rapid increase 
in spreads in relation to the yields on German Bunds. Just 
as the measures to support the financial institutions had 
contributed to the rise in the public debt ratio during 
the first phase of the financial crisis, the tensions affect-
ing government securities now in turn had an impact 
on the position of the financial institutions. The fall in 
the value of these securities has a direct adverse effect 
on the value of their portfolios and on their funding. In 10
Table  1  Projections for the main economic reGions














  GDP in volume
World   ..................... 5.0 3.7 3.5
of which :
United States  .......... 3.0 1.6 1.5
Japan  ................. 4.0 –0.4 1.8
European Union  ........ 2.0 1.6 0.6
China  ................. 10.3 9.2 8.6
India  .................. 8.5 7.5 7.5
Russia   ................. 4.0 3.9 3.8
Brazil  ................. 7.5 3.6 4.0
p.m. World imports  .........   14.0   6.5   5.0
  inflation  (1)
United States  .............. 1.6 3.2 1.9
Japan  ..................... –0.7 –0.2 –0.1
European Union  ............ 2.1 3.0 2.0
  Unemployment  (2)
United States  .............. 9.6 9.0 9.0
Japan  ..................... 5.1 4.9 4.8
European Union  ............ 9.7 9.7 9.8
Source : EC (autumn forecasts, November 2011).
(1)  Consumer price index.
(2)  In % of the labour force.
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Inflation (HICP)  ............................. 1.6   2.6 / 2.8   1.5 / 2.5 2.3 3.5 2.4
GDP in volume  ............................. 1.8   1.5 / 1.7   –0.4 / 1.0 2.3 2.0 0.5
of which :
Private consumption  .................... 0.8   0.3 / 0.5   –0.4 / 0.6 2.3 1.0 0.2
Public consumption  ..................... 0.5   –0.3 / 0.5   –0.5 / 0.7 0.2 1.3 2.9
Investment  ............................ –0.6   1.6 / 2.4   –1.6 / 1.8 –0.9 4.9 1.2
Exports  ............................... 10.8   5.4 / 7.2   0.3 / 6.1 9.9 5.5 1.7
Imports  ............................... 9.2   4.0 / 5.4   –0.5 / 5.1 8.7 6.0 2.1
Sources : ECB, NBB.
 
these circumstances, there was a fall in the share prices of 
financial institutions on the stock markets. This deteriora-
tion in the position of the financial system in turn triggers 
speculation about the need for governments to provide 
further assistance for struggling institutions.
Coming on top of the slowdown in external demand 
and the short-term effects of the efforts to restore sound 
public finances, these financial tensions and the severe 
uncertainty depress domestic demand for consumption 
and investment. For their part, the monetary authori-
ties responded to the development of a recessive spiral 
between the problems of public finances, those of the 
financial institutions and the developments in real activ-
ity. The ECB Governing Council cut its key interest rates 
by 25 basis points on 3 November 2011, and the various 
measures strengthening the granting of liquidity were 
maintained or reinforced in the United States, while they 
were reactivated in the euro area  (1).
In this context, the prospects for the growth of activity 
in 2011 and 2012 for most of the advanced economies 
were downgraded in recent months. According to the 
EC’s autumn forecasts, GDP growth in the United States 
will be only 1.6  % in 2011 and 1.5  % in 2012. For the 
European Union as a whole, growth is actually forecast 
to fall from 1.6  % in 2011 to 0.6  %. Among the main 
advanced economies, only Japan is expected to see any 
acceleration between those two years, but that will be 
merely an automatic rebound effect following the loss of 
(1)  On 8 December 2011, the ECB Governing Council decided to cut the key interest 
rates by a further 25 basis points and to reinforce the measures for granting 
liquidity to the financial institutions.11
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Box – Assumptions adopted for the projections
Produced as part of a joint exercise, the Eurosystem’s economic projections for the euro area and the Bank’s 
projections for Belgium are based on a set of technical assumptions and forecasts for the international environment 
drawn up jointly by the ECB and the national central banks of the Eurosystem.
Exchange rates are held constant at the average levels recorded in the last ten days before the cut-off date for 
the assumptions, in mid-November 2011. This gives a USD / EUR exchange rate of 1.36, which is a little below the 
2011 average (1.40).
In line with the implicit prices reflected in forward contracts, the price of a barrel of Brent crude on the international 
markets is expected to increase from an average of $ 79.6 in 2010 to $ 111.5 in 2011, before dropping back to 
$ 109.4 in 2012.
In view of the expected slowdown in imports by Belgium’s partners both within the euro area and in third 
countries, the volume growth of the export markets is expected to fall from over 10 % in 2010 to 5.8 % in 2011 
and 3.7 % in 2012.
The interest rate assumptions are also based on market expectations up to mid-November 2011. As an annual 
average, three-month interbank deposit rates are projected to rise from 0.8  % in 2010 to 1.4  % in 2011, before 
dropping to 1.2 % in 2012. This fall mainly reflects the key interest rate cut made by the ECB Governing Council 
on 3 November and, more generally, the deterioration in the economic climate.
Yields on ten-year Belgian government bonds are estimated at 4.3  % in 2011 and 5.1  % in 2012, compared 
to 3.5  % in 2010. The increase in the yields on Belgian government bonds is due partly to the widespread rise 
expected for the euro area in 2012, and partly to the recent widening of the spread in relation to yields on German 
Bunds, which reached 277 basis points in November 2011. The assumptions keep this differential constant up to 
the end of the projection period.
The expected movement in rates charged by banks on business investment loans and private mortgage loans takes 
account of the transmission which usually occurs in relation to the benchmark rates. Thus, mortgage interest rates 
are influenced to a great extent by the yields on ten-year government bonds, while the rates charged on business 
loans depend on shorter maturities.
4
output during the current year. In general, such growth 
rates would be insufficient to achieve any significant 
reduction in unemployment. 
Against this backdrop of severe financial tensions, plum-
meting business and consumer confidence, and the 
slackening pace of external demand, the Eurosystem 
projections for GDP growth in the euro area were also 
substantially downgraded. They now range between –0.4 
and 1  % in 2012, a modest recovery being predicted 
during the year after a period of stagnation, or even mild 
recession, in late 2011 and early 2012. As an annual 
average, GDP is forecast to grow in real terms by around 
1.5 to 1.7  % in 2011. The divergences in performance 
between euro area countries will continue to be signifi-
cant ; they are due, in particular, to the scale of the adjust-
ment efforts to be made in regard to public finances or 
the restoration of the competitiveness of the economies 
with serious imbalances to correct. 
Inflation in the euro area came to 3  % from September to 
November 2011, owing to the high level of energy and 
food prices in recent months. This base effect should fade 
away during 2012, while domestic pressures on costs – par-
ticularly labour costs – should continue to be contained. 
According to the Eurosystem projections, annual average 
inflation in the euro area is put at between 1.5 and 2.5 % in 
2012, compared to a range of 2.6 to 2.8 % in 2011.12






















































































CRUDE OIL PRICES (1)
(monthly averages per barrel of Brent)
In euro Rate on three-month interbank deposits in euro
INTEREST RATES (2)
(quarterly averages)
Rate on ten-year Belgian government bonds
p.m. Rate on ten-year German Bunds
Source : ECB.
(1)  Actual figures up to October 2011, assumptions from November 2011.










Interest rate on three-month interbank deposits in euro   ....... 0.8 1.4 1.2
Yield on ten-year Belgian government bonds  ................ 3.5 4.3 5.1
EUR/USD exchange rate  .................................. 1.33 1.40 1.36
Oil price (US dollars per barrel)  ............................ 79.6 111.5 109.4
(percentage changes)
Export markets relevant to Belgium  ........................ 10.1 5.8 3.7
Competitors’ export prices  ................................ 6.1 4.0 1.9
Source : ECB.
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2.  Activity, employment and demand
In Belgium, too, at the beginning of 2011 it looked as 
if the revival in activity which had begun in mid-2009 
might persist. Year-on-year, GDP grew by 2.9  % in the 
first quarter, and was up by 2.2  % in the second quarter. 
As the economy climbed out of recession, the growth 
basis widened from exports to domestic demand, with 
private consumption first followed by business investment 
at the beginning of 2011 making a positive contribution 
to growth. 
The deterioration in the external environment, the rising 
financial tensions and the accompanying heightened 
uncertainty brought that trend to an abrupt halt during 
the summer of 2011. According to the NAI’s flash 
estimates, GDP stagnated in the third quarter and 
– taking account, in particular, of the adverse trend in 
the economic indicators – growth is expected to remain 
close to zero at the end of the year and in early 2012. 
Activity is expected to pick up thereafter, supported in 
particular by foreign demand. However, the revival is likely 
Chart 3  Activity AnD unEmploymEnt
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Sources : EC, NAI, NBB.
(1)  Seasonally adjusted data.
(2)  Harmonised unemployment rate (15 years and over) as a percentage of the labour force.
to be restrained by the continuing uncertain outlook, in a 
context of essential retrenchment of public finances and 
strengthening of the financial institutions. 
Overall, the projections for Belgium presented here show 
GDP growing by 2  % in 2011 and 0.5  % in 2012. These 
figures have been revised downwards by 0.6 and 1.8 per-
centage points respectively since the projections published 
in June. 
After having proved unexpectedly resilient at the height 
of the 2008-2009 recession, job creation responded 
particularly strongly to the revival in activity from the 
beginning of 2010. As an annual average, the volume of 
labour was up by 1.1  % in 2010 and 1.8  % in 2011. The 
increase in the number of persons in work was 0.3 per-
centage point lower in each of those years, owing to the 
normalisation of the implicit working time per employee.
Whereas the flexibility systems permitting a downward 
adjustment in working time – notably temporary lay-
offs – had been heavily used in 2009, recourse to those 
systems diminished as activity picked up. In view of the 14
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serious deterioration in the business climate, employment 
is forecast to grow by no more than 0.4  % in 2012, with 
the volume of labour expanding by 0.2 %.
The annual average growth rates partially conceal the 
movement in employment during the year, as most net 
job creation was concentrated between the beginning of 
2010 and the second quarter of 2011. Altogether, around 
63 000 additional jobs were created in net terms – i.e. the 
difference between new jobs and jobs which have been 
abolished – during 2010, followed by a further 38 000 
in the first half of 2011. Subsequently, the expansion of 
employment slowed considerably, though it remained 
slightly positive. Between mid-2011 and the end of 2012, 
domestic employment is forecast to expand by around 
23 000 units. This growth is expected to come from the 
continuing rise in the number of persons employed under 
the service voucher system and in the health sector and 
other non-market services. Apart from these jobs, signifi-
cant losses of around 15 to 20 000 jobs are expected in 
the branches sensitive to the business cycle.
Taking account of the combined effects of the slackening 
pace of net job creation and the steady rise in the number 
of persons entering the labour market, the declining trend 
in unemployment seen in recent months, down from 
8.5 % in the spring of 2010 to 6.6 % in October 2011, will 
be reversed in 2012. On average, the harmonised unem-
ployment rate is predicted at 7 % in that year.
In parallel with the favourable trend in employment, the 
factors generating demand widened during 2010 and 
in early 2011, providing a more balanced basis for GDP 
growth. While net exports had been the first to join in 
the revival in activity from mid-2009, the change in inven-
tories soon ceased to hold back growth and then began 
making a positive contribution at the end of 2010 and 
the beginning of 2011. The other components of domes-
tic demand also gathered strength. The resurgence of 
financial tensions and the widespread deterioration in the 
business climate and the outlook cast a dark shadow over 
this picture. At the end of 2011 and in 2012, net exports 
and the change in inventories are both expected to make 
a negative contribution to growth, while the support pro-
vided by domestic demand should dwindle rapidly.
After having benefited up to the first quarter of 2011 from 
the renewed vigour of external demand, particularly that 
originating from the emerging economies and their main 
suppliers, including Germany, exports of goods and ser-
vices began to suffer from the general loss of momentum 
on those markets from the second quarter. The expansion 
of foreign markets is projected to continue at a modest 
pace in the coming quarters, with growth subsiding from 
10.1  % in 2010 to 5.8  % in 2011 and 3.7  % in 2012, 
according to the Eurosystem’s assumptions. This time, 
the foreign markets are therefore not expected to con-
tract, in contrast to what happened in 2009 when world 
trade declined by more than 10  % in volume. Overall, 
the volume of Belgium’s exports is expected to display a 
similar profile, with the growth forecast down from 9.9 to 
5.5  %. In 2012, growth is likely to amount to just 1.7 %, 
as the latest indicators obtained from the foreign trade 
statistics and the business surveys suggest a temporary dip 
in exports of goods by Belgium at the end of 2011, and 
therefore an adverse starting point for the ensuing year.
In comparison with the other components of domestic 
demand, household consumption growth had picked up 
fairly quickly following the crisis  : after a sharp decelera-
tion in 2009, consumption grew by 2.3  % in real terms 
in 2010. This expansion was due largely to the rapid 
decline in the savings ratio, as households became more 
optimistic again about the economic outlook, particularly 
in regard to employment. This effect did not strengthen 
further in 2011, so that private consumption was 1 % up 
against the previous year, a figure similar to the growth 
of purchasing power. The impact of high inflation which, 15
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since the end of 2010, has eroded the rise in dispos-
able incomes by more than 3 percentage points, was 
compounded from the summer by the loss of consumer 
confidence. In this regard, Belgian households have been 
affected not only by the general deterioration in the eco-
nomic climate in Europe and by the financial tensions, but 
also by the protracted debate over the budget prospects 
in Belgium. Thus, the volume of private consumption is 
set to rise by only 0.2 % in 2012, owing to the combined 
effects of a meagre 1.2  % increase in disposable income 
and a 0.8 percentage point rise in the savings ratio in 
2012. That puts the savings ratio at 17  %, or slightly 
above the figure for 2000 to 2007. In this very uncertain 
context, and taking account of the gradual rise in mort-
gage interest rates, household investment in housing is 
likely to fall again in 2011 and 2012, by around 1.5 % per 
annum. In 2010, it had been temporarily underpinned by 
the measures to revitalise construction, notably via a cut 
in the VAT rate for the first tranche of new building work.
Following a cumulative decline of around 11  % in 2009 
and 2010, the volume of business investment is predicted 
to recover by 7.8 % in 2011. This catch-up will take place 
against the backdrop of a marked increase in capacity 
utilisation rates – up from 70.1 % in April 2009 to 81.2 % 
in April 2011, which is close to the average for the past 
two decades according to the survey of manufacturing 
industry – in parallel with the strengthening of final 
demand and the restoration of corporate profitability. The 
gross operating surplus of firms in fact climbed by 10  % 
in 2010, and is set to rise by a further 6.1  % for 2011, 
bolstering the internal financing capacity of companies. 
With the weakening of demand and the substantial 
decline in capacity utilisation rates in industry during 
2011 – down to just 78.4 % in October 2011 – business 
investment is forecast to slow down in 2012, growing by 
just 1.7 %.
Finally, government spending on consumption is forecast 
to expand in real terms by 1.3  % in 2011 and 2.9  % in 
2012, in the absence of specific measures to restrain 
it. Government investment is likely to record sustained 
growth in 2011 and 2012 of over 5 % per annum, owing 
to the impending local elections.
Table  3  GDP, emPloyment anD main exPenDiture cateGories










GDP  (1)  ................................................. –2.7 2.3 2.0 0.5
Total volume of labour  (2)   .................................. –1.6 1.1 1.8 0.2
Total domestic employment in persons  ..................... –0.2 0.8 1.5 0.4
p.m. Change in thousands of persons  .......................   –7.6   37.0   68.3   18.3
Real disposable income of individuals   ....................... 2.9 –0.5 0.9 1.2
  Expenditure components  (1)
Private consumption expenditure ........................... 0.8 2.3 1.0 0.2
Consumption expenditure of general government  ............ 0.8 0.2 1.3 2.9
Gross fixed capital formation  .............................. –8.1 –0.9 4.9 1.2
Housing  .............................................. –9.2 1.6 –1.5 –1.3
General government  ................................... 7.2 –1.8 5.4 5.3
Enterprises   ............................................ –9.3 –1.6 7.8 1.7
p.m. Domestic expenditure excluding change in inventories  (3)   ..   –1.3   1.1   1.8   1.1
Change in inventories  (3)  .................................. –0.7 0.0 0.5 –0.3
Net exports of goods and services  (3)  ........................ –0.7 1.2 –0.2 –0.3
Exports of goods and services  ........................... –11.3 9.9 5.5 1.7
Imports of goods and services  ........................... –10.6 8.7 6.0 2.1
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  In volume.
(2)  Total number of hours worked in the economy.
(3)  Contribution to change in GDP.
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Chart 5  inflAtion
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3.  Prices and costs
Since the end of 2010, consumer price inflation in 
Belgium has been running at significantly above 3  %. 
According to the current projections, it is likely to exceed 
that rate until the initial months of 2012 before gradually 
subsiding to around 2  % at the end of the year. Inflation 
is estimated at an average of 3.5  % in 2011 – compared 
to 2.7 % in the euro area – and 2.4 % in 2012.
The high level of overall inflation in 2011 is largely due to 
the volatile inflation components. In particular, the prices 
of energy products included in the HICP basket increased 
by 10  %, on average, in 2010 and will have risen by a 
further 17 % over 2011 as a whole. The reason lies mainly 
in the rapid rise in petroleum product prices on the inter-
national markets. Crude oil reached $ 123 per barrel of 
Brent in April, and remained persistently high thereafter at 
around $ 110 per barrel. Taking account of the assump-
tion of a slight decline in petroleum product prices during 
the period covered by the projections, the base effects 
resulting from fluctuations in those prices should become 
less marked, which accounts for the expected decline 
in inflation. However, that movement is partly offset by 
the considerable increase in the electricity supply tariffs 
in large areas of Flanders, which will have an estimated 
impact on the energy component of inflation amounting 
to around 1 percentage point in 2011 and 2012 ; it is due 
to the substantial cost of the regional subsidies for the 
installation of photovoltaic panels.
While the energy component is expected to bring a grad-
ual deceleration in 2012, underlying inflation is likely to 
remain high. It increased at the end of 2010 and in early 
2011, rising from an average of 1.1  % in 2010 to 1.7  % 
in April 2011 – driven mainly by services – and is expected 
to remain slightly above that level. This movement is due 
partly to the allowance for higher fuel and food prices 
in airline tickets or catering services, for example. Price 
adjustments directly linked to inflation or other reference 
indices for a range of services are another contributory 
factor. Finally, it is also supported by the strong rise in 
labour costs, itself fuelled largely by wage indexation 
based on the health index.
After remaining stable in 2010, unit labour costs in 
Belgium’s private sector are set to increase significantly in 
2011 and 2012 by 2.2 and 2.9 % respectively. This strong 17
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acceleration of unit labour costs is due to the combination 
of anaemic productivity gains and a stronger rise in hourly 
labour costs. Overall, the cumulative increase of more 
than 5 % during the two years covered by these forecasts 
significantly exceeds the EC and OECD predictions for 
the three main trading partners – Germany, France and 
the Netherlands – thus eroding the competitiveness of 
Belgian firms. 
In 2010, apparent labour productivity had picked up by 
0.9  %, owing to the absorption of firms’ labour reserves 
which had been under-used during the 2008-2009 reces-
sion. In reality, this gain was relatively small, and was 
insufficient to restore the level of productivity to its poten-
tial path following the losses suffered during the first 
phase of the crisis. In addition, the deteriorating economic 
conditions during the second half of 2011 and in 2012 
will bring the productivity gains down to 0.3 and 0.4  % 
per annum for those two years, well below the average 
figures. Meagre productivity gains have been a feature 
of the Belgian economy since 2007. During periods of 
weak business activity, this is due to the practice of labour 
hoarding and the low level of investment. Apart from 
these cyclical fluctuations, it could also be due to the use 
of low-skilled workers, supported by the various employ-
ment promotion measures mentioned above. However, 
there is hardly any sign of that in a smaller average rise in 
labour costs, which one might expect if the proportion of 
this type of job is increased. 
The growth of hourly labour costs is forecast to gather 
pace from 0.9 % in 2010 to 2.5 % in 2011 and 3.3 % in 
2012. This strong acceleration is very largely due to the 
automatic indexation of wages. According to the projec-
tions, the health index of consumer prices – used as the 
reference for indexation – should rise by 3.1  % in 2011 
and 2.4  % in 2012. However, in view of the time lags 
which result from the indexation mechanisms applied by 
the various joint committees, the impact on wages will 
be a little more pronounced in the second year. Apart 
from indexation, the assumption adopted for the move-
ment in hourly labour costs in the private sector in 2011 
and 2012 essentially takes account of the maximum 
0.3  % increase in negotiated wages planned for the 
second year under the draft central agreement imposed 
by the government.
4.  Public finances
The projections for public expenditure presented in this 
article do not go beyond 2011, since the budgetary agree-
ment concluded on 26 November 2011 in connection 
with the formation of the federal government came after 
the cut-off date for the projections.
On the basis of the latest information, public finances 
should end the year 2011 with a deficit of 4.2 % of GDP, 
which is 0.1  % of GDP higher than the previous year’s 
deficit.
Fiscal and parafiscal revenues are projected to remain 
stable as a ratio of GDP in 2011. Although taxes on goods 
and services will decline owing to the fall in consumption 
of tobacco products and road fuel, which are relatively 
heavily taxed, particularly via excise duties, the levies on 
labour will increase slightly. Conversely, non-fiscal and 
non-parafiscal revenues will surge in 2011, partly on 
account of the new levy under the deposit protection 
system, and partly because of the strong increase in pay-
ments to the government in compensation for the sup-
port given during the financial crisis, particularly following 
Table  4  Price and cost indicators










Total HICP  .............................................. 0.0 2.3 3.5 2.4
Energy  ............................................... –14.0 10.0 17.0 4.3
Total excluding energy  ................................. 1.9 1.3 1.8 2.1
GDP deflator   ............................................ 1.2 1.8 2.5 2.3
Labour costs in the private sector :
Unit labour costs  ...................................... 4.0 0.0 2.2 2.9
Hourly costs  .......................................... 2.8 0.9 2.5 3.3
Sources : EC, NAI, NBB.
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Table  5  General Government accountS  (1)








Revenue   ................... 48.0 48.8 48.9
Fiscal and parafiscal 
revenue  ................. 42.7 43.2 43.2
Other  ................... 5.2 5.5 5.8
Primary expenditure   ......... 50.1 49.5 49.8
Primary balance  ............ –2.2 –0.7 –0.9
Interest charges  ............ 3.6 3.3 3.3
Financing requirement (–) or 
capacity  ................... –5.8 –4.1 –4.2
p.m. Effect of non-recurrent 
factors  ...............   –1.0   0.0   –0.1
Consolidated gross debt  ..... 95.9 96.2 97.7
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  According to the methodology used in the excessive deficit procedure.
 
Table  6  Comparison of the foreCasts for Belgium






















NBB – Autumn 2011   ........................ 2.0 0.5 3.5 2.4 –4.2 n. December 2011
p.m. Spring 2011   ...........................   2.6   2.2   3.4   2.2   –3.5   –4.1   June 2011
NAI  ....................................... 2.4 1.6 3.5 2.0 n. n. September 2011
IMF  ....................................... 2.4 1.5 3.1 2.0 –3.5 –3.4 September 2011
EC  ....................................... 2.2 0.9 3.5 2.0 –3.6 –4.6 November 2011
OECD  ..................................... 2.0 0.5 3.4 2.5 –3.5 –3.2 November 2011
p.m. Actual figures for 2010  .................   2.3   2.3   –4.1
(1)  HICP, except for NAI : national consumer price index.
(2)  In % of GDP.
 
the first payment by KBC in this respect for the funding 
injected by the authorities.
Primary expenditure, which still stood at 49.5 % of GDP 
in 2010, is set to increase to 49.8  % of GDP in 2011. 
That rise is due essentially to the measures taken follow-
ing the problems encountered by Holding Communal, a 
major shareholder in Dexia, whose share price collapsed. 
Those events led to a capital transfer amounting to 
0.2 % of GDP from the government to that institution  (1).
Interest charges should remain fairly stable in 2011. The 
public debt is expected to increase, but the impact on 
interest charges should be almost entirely neutralised by 
the – albeit modest – reduction in interest rates.
The government debt ratio are driven up by the loans 
which the Belgian State contracted in order to finance the 
purchase of Dexia Bank Belgium and by the loans granted 
to Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
5.  Risk factor assessment
In line with the Eurosystem projections for the euro area, 
the results presented here for Belgium show activity 
stagnating at the end of 2011 and in early 2012, followed 
by a modest recovery in the second half of the year. On 
that basis, the GDP growth forecast is lower than the ones 
published in recent months by other institutions, with the 
exception of the OECD. Nonetheless, the risks surrounding 
these projections – if they were to materialise – seem 
predominantly, or even almost exclusively, likely to curb 
activity even further. 
In view of the normal volatility of short-term movements 
in activity and the usual statistical data revisions, a modest 
decline in GDP in any particular quarter is not ruled out, 
even in the baseline scenario adopted for these projec-
tions. However, in this scenario, the absence of a severe 
recession in the short term and the return to growth 
(1)  Because of the uncertainty in this matter, the projections take no account of the 
potential impact of the guarantee, amounting to 0.4 % of GDP, granted to the 
cooperative partners in the Arco Group.19
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during 2012 imply that the uncertain climate is easing, or 
at the very least that it is having a less severe effect on the 
behaviour of firms and households. Clearly, this presup-
poses that the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area does 
not worsen and that its repercussions on the financial 
institutions are contained.
Even if there is stabilisation at this level, the financial insti-
tutions must proceed to complete a radical restructuring 
in order to rectify their position and adapt to the new 
environment in regard to market conditions and pruden-
tial regulation. That will entail a reduction in the size of 
their balance sheet or an increase in capital. Depending 
on how this adjustment is carried out, lending to busi-
nesses and households could be affected to a greater 
extent than foreseen, and thus impair the recovery.
In addition, in some euro area countries, the fiscal con-
solidation needs to continue and be reinforced in order to 
attain the targets set by the stability programmes. 
More generally, the situation in the euro area presents a 
risk for partners in other economies around the world, 
on top of their own specific problems. A greater than 
expected weakening of demand in the United States, the 
United Kingdom or the emerging economies, which are 
among Europe’s main trading partners, would damage 
one of the potential sources of the recovery.
More specifically in regard to Belgium, in view of the time 
taken to reach agreement, the new government’s budget 
measures could not be incorporated in these projections. 
On the one hand, some of those measures are likely to 
restrict activity and incomes. On the other hand, if they 
permit a credible reform of the public accounts and bring-
ing the debt to a path which is sustainable in the long 
term, they could encourage households to reduce the 
precautionary savings which they would otherwise have 
accumulated to guard against the threats which a derail-
ment of public finances would present for their income 
prospects. Fiscal consolidation could also reduce the risk 
premium included in interest rates. 
In general, structural measures for the labour market and 
pensions should also provide long-term support for fiscal 
consolidation and the strengthening of the economy’s 
growth potential and competitiveness. In that regard, the 
expected rise in inflation, and hence labour costs, exceed 
the figures for competitors, and therefore threaten the 
expansion of activity and employment.20
Projections for the Belgian economy : summary of the main results












  growth (calendar adjusted data)
GDP in volume  .......................................... 0.9 –2.7 2.3 2.0 0.5
Contributions to growth :
Domestic expenditure, excluding change in inventories   ...... 2.0 –1.2 1.1 1.8 1.1
Net exports of goods and services  ....................... –0.8 –0.7 1.2 –0.2 –0.3
Change in inventories  .................................. –0.3 –0.7 0.0 0.5 –0.3
  Prices and costs
Harmonised index of consumer prices  ...................... 4.5 0.0 2.3 3.5 2.4
Health index  ............................................ 4.2 0.6 1.7 3.1 2.4
GDP deflator   ............................................ 2.2 1.2 1.8 2.5 2.3
Terms of trade  .......................................... –2.4 3.4 –1.5 –1.1 0.0
Unit labour costs in the private sector  ...................... 3.5 4.0 0.0 2.2 2.9
Hourly labour costs in the private sector  .................... 3.6 2.8 0.9 2.5 3.3
Hourly productivity in the private sector  .................... 0.1 –1.2 0.9 0.3 0.4
  labour market
Domestic employment  
(average annual change in thousands of persons)  ............ 79.1 –7.6 37.0 68.3 18.3
p.m. Change during the year, in thousands of persons  (1)  ......     63.1     –23.2     63.4     55.7     4.8
Total volume of labour  (2)   .................................. 1.5 –1.6 1.1 1.8 0.2
Harmonised unemployment rate  (3)  
(in % of the labour force)  ................................ 7.0 8.0 8.4 6.9 7.0
  incomes
Real disposable income of individuals   ....................... 2.2 2.9 –0.5 0.9 1.2
Savings ratio of individuals (in % of disposable income)   ........ 16.8 18.4 16.2 16.2 17.0
  Public finances  (4)
Overall balance (in % of GDP) ............................. –1.3 –5.8 –4.1 –4.2 n.
Primary balance (in % of GDP)  ............................ 2.5 –2.2 –0.7 –0.9 n.
Public debt (in % of GDP)  ................................ 89.3 95.9 96.2 97.7 n.
  current account  
  (according to the balance of payments, in % of GDP)  ........   –1.6   –1.7   1.5   0.9   0.3
Sources : EC, DGSEI, NAI, NBB.
(1)  Difference between the fourth quarter of the year concerned and the fourth quarter of the previous year.
(2)  Total number of hours worked in the economy.
(3)  In % of the labour force (15‑64 years), non calendar adjusted data.
(4)  According to the methodology used in the excessive deficit procedure (EDP).
 
Annex